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Building the nation’s body: the contested role of abortion and family 1 
planning in post-war South Sudan 2 
Abstract 3 
This paper offers an ethnographic analysis of public health policies and interventions targeting 4 
unwanted pregnancy (family planning and abortion) in contemporary South Sudan as part of wider 5 
‘nation-building’ after war, understood as a process of collective identity formation which projects a 6 
meaningful future by redefining existing institutions and customs as national characteristics. The 7 
paper shows how the expansion of post-conflict family planning and abortion policy and services are 8 
particularly poignant sites for the enactment of reproductive identity negotiation, policing and 9 
conflict. In addition to customary norms, these processes are shaped by two powerful institutions - 10 
ethnic movements and global humanitarian actors - who tend to take opposing stances on 11 
reproductive health. Drawing on document review, observations of the media and policy 12 
environment and interviews conducted with 54 key informants between 2013 and 2015, the paper 13 
shows that during the civil war, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and Movement mobilised 14 
customary pro-natalist ideals for military gain by entreating women to amplify reproduction to 15 
replace those lost to war and rejecting family planning and abortion. International donors and the 16 
Ministry of Health have re-conceptualised such services as among other modern developments 17 
denied by war. The tensions between these competing discourses have given rise to a range of 18 
societal responses, including disagreements that erupt in legal battles, heated debate and even 19 
violence towards women and health workers. In United Nations camps established recently as parts 20 
of South Sudan have returned to war, social groups exert a form of reproductive surveillance, 21 
policing reproductive health practices and contributing to intra-communal violence when 22 
clandestine use of contraception or abortion is discovered. In a context where modern 23 
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contraceptives and abortion services are largely unfamiliar, conflict around South Sudan’s nation-24 
building project is partially manifest through tensions and violence in the domain of reproduction. 25 
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Introduction 26 
War unquestionably harms people’s health and health infrastructures. Maternal mortality, one of 27 
the most important indicators of the performance of health systems, for example, is elevated during 28 
armed conflict (UNFPA, 2015). War can also accelerate social change capable of sustaining, fostering 29 
or subverting national, cultural and gender identities (Grabksa, 2014; Hammond, 2004). Such 30 
extreme circumstances put cultural systems at risk of seismic change, and reveal the implicit 31 
assumptions and contradictions underlying previously unquestioned power relations (Ginsburg & 32 
Rapp, 1995). In moments of crisis, the ways people struggle to deliver and access healthcare can be 33 
interpreted as projections of their disparate views of the nation they are struggling to construct 34 
(Baines, 2003; DiMoia, 2013; Wick, 2008). In this paper, we analyse public health policies and 35 
interventions targeting unwanted pregnancy (family planning and abortion) in contemporary South 36 
Sudan as part of wider ‘nation-building’ after war. We understand national-building as a process of 37 
collective identity formation which projects a meaningful future by redefining existing institutions 38 
and customs as national characteristics (von Bogdandy et al., 2005). 39 
Reproduction, in particular, provides a terrain for imagining new cultural futures. Children are born 40 
into complex social arrangements through which legacies of property, positions, rights and values 41 
are negotiated over time. When mothering is viewed as women’s primary social role, women are not 42 
only biological reproducers but also key cultural ‘transmitters’ (Yuval-Davis, 2003). Reproduction is 43 
therefore “inextricably bound up in the (re)production of culture” (Ginsburg & Rapp, 1995, 2) and 44 
integral to identity formation when cultural ideals are at the core of conflicts, as in South Sudan.  45 
So as to assert this identity politically, groups in conflict tend to suppress heterogeneity to speak of 46 
their hardship in a homogeneous voice and to represent the true ‘essence’ of their culture (Yuval-47 
Davis, 2003). In ethnic-based conflicts, it is common for gender identities to become hardened 48 
(Erten, 2015; Malkki, 1995; Shiffman et al., 2002) or essentialised (Grabksa, 2014). Women are 49 
transformed into boundary-makers in upholding ethnic purity, reified as the reproducers of the 50 
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ethnic group and therefore in need of protection (Yuval-Davis, 2003). Masculinities become 51 
militarised, with men enjoined to kill enemy men and defile enemy women to deliberately disrupt 52 
the ethnic purity and cultural continuity of the other group (Einhorn, 2006). Armed movements from 53 
Serbia, Rwanda, Burundi, Japan, Palestine, and Turkey to South Sudan have therefore called for 54 
women to bear babies ‘for the nation’ (Einhorn, 2006; Erten, 2015; Malkki, 1995; Shiffman et al., 55 
2002). 56 
While war exaggerates femininities and masculinities, plenty of women and men resist enacting such 57 
singular visions of their bodies (Baines, 2003). War can also empower and emancipate people. 58 
Displacement over international borders can liberalise gender relations through encounters with 59 
global humanitarianism or host communities, as it did for South Sudanese in Kenya and Uganda 60 
(Edward, 2007; Grabksa, 2014), Burundians in Tanzania (Malkki, 1995) and Afghans in Iran (Piran, 61 
2004). After conflicts, however, many nations seek to reassert cultural norms to impose the ethnic 62 
ideals for which a war was fought (Abramowitz & Moran, 2012; Einhorn, 2006; Mclean-Hilker, 2014). 63 
Repatriation of displaced populations therefore often involves a difficult period of reconciling 64 
cultural differences (Grabksa, 2014; Hammond, 2004).  Returnee women, in particular, are often 65 
perceived as agents of social transformation that threaten established gender relations (Grabksa, 66 
2014).  67 
Those seeking to uphold patriarchal norms of ‘the nation’ during and after war thus often monitor or 68 
police women’s behaviour – through the legal systems, public shaming, violence and threats of 69 
violence –  to ensure that they enact their allotted roles (Baines, 2003; Einhorn, 2006). ‘Reproductive 70 
control’ (Moore et al., 2010) or ‘reproductive coercion’ (Miller & Silverman, 2010) – men’s attempts 71 
to promote pregnancy in their female partners through verbal pressure and threats, contraceptives 72 
interference or sabotage, and coercion related to pregnancy continuation or termination – may help 73 
explain why intimate partner violence is often associated with reduced contraceptive uptake and 74 
abortion (Adjiwanou & N'Bouke, 2015; Coyle et al., 2015). Women’s access to economic power and 75 
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cultural ideologies about what they can achieve also influence women’s own willingness to limit 76 
their births (Browner, 2000). Women’s susceptibility to reproductive coercion and the gendered 77 
meanings they assign to their reproductive behaviours are thus highly dependent on the local 78 
politics of reproduction (Browner, 2000; Ginsburg & Rapp, 1995). 79 
International organisations and foreign governments, in contrast, commonly see the end of war as 80 
an opportunity for bold interventions that mark a break from a nation’s chaotic past (Cometto et al., 81 
2010; Percival et al., 2014, 1). Seemingly technical projects like funding health programmes and 82 
formulating health policy serve the ambitious goal of promoting state legitimacy and peace-building 83 
through the delivery of strong health services (Kruk et al., 2010; von Bogdandy et al., 2005). Public 84 
hospitals thus become overtly political spaces, the sites of presidential ribbon-cutting ceremonies, , 85 
protests, and even mob justice (Radio Tamazuj, 2015; South Sudan News Agency, 2014).  86 
As studies from other post-conflict settings make clear, encounters with fertility control technologies 87 
are “not simply an issue of a technological object in isolation but rather an entire cultural package 88 
and the sets of values and aspirations associated with it” (DiMoia, 2013, 9; Erten, 2015; McGinn, 89 
2000; Shiffman et al., 2002). Family planning, in particular, is proposed as an antidote to war, 90 
capable of empowering women to participate in peace talks and reduce fertility to ward off a 91 
demographic ‘youth bulge’ that contributes to future conflicts (Potts et al., 2015). Below, we 92 
examine how family planning and abortion become particularly poignant sites for the enactment of 93 
reproductive identity negotiation, policing and conflict, configuring reproduction in relation to the 94 
idea of the nation, at a time when populations are mixing, institutions reorganising, and identities 95 
shifting.  96 
Specifically, we describe conflicting discourses about control of women’s reproduction promulgated 97 
by customary institutions, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) and 98 
international donors with the Ministry of Health (MoH). Following Macleod et al (2011), we 99 
understand discourses as coherent systems of meanings that support institutions, are located in 100 
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history, and produce power relations and ideological effects. We also acknowledge that people do 101 
not develop oppositional positions independent of categories in the dominant culture (Ginsburg & 102 
Rapp, 1995). While customary institutions in South Sudan uphold marriage traditions that promote 103 
many children and post-partum abstinence, the SPLA mobilise pro-natalist ideals and reject post-104 
partum abstinence and modern family planning technologies for military gain and for nation-building 105 
after the war. Meanwhile, international donors and domestic technical officers within the Ministry 106 
of Health have re-conceptualised control of pregnancy through family planning as a legitimate and 107 
modern post-war nation-building project. We analyse how these competing discourses and 108 
associated interventions have given rise to a range of societal responses, including tensions that 109 
erupt in violence between women, men, and health workers in healthcare institutions. As parts of 110 
South Sudan have returned to war (2013-present), these tensions have come to a head in the 111 
confined spaces of United Nations (UN) camps where interventions require less negotiation with the 112 
government but war still shapes women’s power. Here, what we term ‘reproductive surveillance’ 113 
limits women’s use of accessible family planning services and leads to intra-communal violence 114 
when clandestine abortion is discovered. We conclude that, in a context where modern family 115 
planning and abortion services are largely unfamiliar, conflict around nation-building is partially 116 
manifest through violence in these domains. 117 
Methods 118 
Our analysis is based on ethnographic research conducted by JJP between 2013 and 2015, as part of 119 
a multi-country study of reproductive health policy change designed and led by KTS. JJP conducted 120 
critical review of policy and media documents; monitoring of social media discussions; and 121 
observations in the capital, Juba during visits to four reproductive health facilities (public and 122 
private), a UN Protection of Civilians camp, and a women’s organisation network event on South 123 
Sudan’s ratification of the ‘Maputo’ Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa.  At the time of field 124 
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work, there were more than 100,000 people living on UN bases, including 33,000 in Juba, nearly all 125 
of whom were ethnic Nuer (UNMISS, 2014).  126 
JJP also conducted interviews with 54 key informants (in Juba and by phone) from the Ministry of 127 
Health, the Ministry of Gender, Child & Social Welfare, the South Sudan Human Rights Commission, 128 
the United Nations Population Agency (UNFPA), nurse and medical training colleges, legal 129 
organisations, domestic women’s organisations, politicians, international and national non-130 
governmental organisations (NGOs), donors, domestic and international universities, health 131 
providers, and international and national journalists. Informants likely to be able to speak about 132 
reproductive health policy were identified through web-searching, recommendations from the 133 
Ministry of Health and Juba University, and snowball sampling. Interviews followed a flexible topic 134 
guide to identify major policy debates and events, policy actors and their positions on family 135 
planning and abortion. When permitted, interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. 136 
Documents were considered public articulations of policy actors’ positions and thematically analysed 137 
together with interview transcripts and field notes which included opinions or positions circulated 138 
orally, first to identify and describe the construction of major policy discourses as they related to 139 
nation-building and second to identify and contextualise instances of policing behaviour 140 
(surveillance and sanctioning) which could suggest social tension between the discourses.  141 
The research ethics review boards of the Ministry of Health, Republic of South Sudan and the 142 
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine approved the study. All informants gave written 143 
informed consent. Because family planning and abortion policy is a highly sensitive issue, individuals' 144 
statements have been anonymised; all interviews were conducted in private with informants 145 
allowed to offer contributions without organisational attribution or being recorded.  146 
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Customary reproductive norms  147 
South Sudanese are encouraged to have families that are as large as possible, including “as many 148 
wives as a man can afford” (Pillsbury et al., 2011, 17) and “as many children as God gives” (Aveyard 149 
& Apune, 2013, 14). The fertility rate is high, at 7.1 live births per woman (MoH-GoSS, 2013b). Large 150 
families not only provide security from high child mortality and care for adults in old age, but also 151 
lend social status (Hutchinson, 1996). Through marriage and the exchange of bride wealth, women 152 
act as bridge-builders, building alliances with other families, clans and ethnic groups (Onyango & 153 
Mott, 2011). New wives are expected to become pregnant quickly, while infertility suggests both 154 
economic and spiritual poverty (Perner, 2001). Young girls who become pregnant are encouraged to 155 
marry, since children’s well-being is the responsibility of men’s families. Almost half (45%) of South 156 
Sudanese women are married and around a quarter (28%) have delivered a live birth by their 18th 157 
birthday (MoH-GoSS & NBS, 2011). Child-spacing through breastfeeding and post-partum abstinence 158 
is common (Aveyard & Apune, 2013), facilitated by the couple living apart temporarily and/or men 159 
spending time with other women. Modern contraceptives are rarely used. Humanitarian agencies 160 
introduced condoms and contraceptive pills on a small scale in 1999 (Pillsbury et al., 2011), but by 161 
2010, the modern contraceptive prevalence ratio was only 1.2% (4.0% for all methods (MoH-GoSS & 162 
NBS, 2011)), and only a third of women could name a modern method (McGinn et al., 2011).  163 
In the absence of contraception, abortion is common. Constitutional law permits abortion to save a 164 
mother’s life or in the case of intra-uterine foetal death (MoLACD, 2009, sections 216-222). Many of 165 
our informants, including a parliamentarian interviewed for this study, believed that “People 166 
understand that abortion is legal when the life of the mother is at risk, they welcome this 167 
intervention even, provided it is managed by professional health workers”. Many others spoke of 168 
abortion as illegal, without nuance (see also Onyango and Mott (2011)). Although widely regarded as 169 
sinful, induced abortion also happens in all South Sudanese ethnic groups (Perner, 2001). Among the 170 
Dinka people, for example, Jok claims that women acceptably justify inducing abortion to other 171 
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women by mobilizing the concept of a ‘broken back’: a euphemism which acknowledges the 172 
reproductive suffering of women who have already had many pregnancies (Jok, 1999a). Among 173 
unmarried women, abortions may also be induced in secret if the woman or her family does not 174 
wish to pursue a marriage (Perner, 2001).  175 
Women mostly self-induce abortions through methods that seek to mimic spontaneous causes, such 176 
as ingesting bitter roots or herbs, an overdose of malaria medicines, laundry detergent, battery acid 177 
or petrol; inserting objects into the cervix; or ‘playing rough’ (Jok, 1999a; Pillsbury et al., 2011). 178 
According to health providers, women in the capital increasingly present for post-abortion care after 179 
self-induction or receiving incomplete terminations by providers in the private health sector. 180 
Complications from unsafe abortions burden already stretched hospital services (Onyango & Mott, 181 
2011). For example, in one tertiary facility, 45% of admissions to the gynaecological unit over a seven 182 
year period were for post-abortion care (Onyango & Mott, 2011). Although data is lacking, unsafe 183 
abortion undoubtedly contributes to South Sudan’s extremely high maternal mortality, estimated to 184 
be between 730 and 2,054 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births (Kassebaum et al., 2014; SSCCSE, 185 
2007; WHO, 2014). 186 
War & the nation’s reproductive front: militarised discourses on 187 
reproduction 188 
During and after Southern Sudan’s second civil war against the Khartoum government in the Arab 189 
north (1983-2005), armed movements in the non-Arab African South mobilised pro-natalist ideals 190 
for military gain and for nation-building, which remain highly influential. Two out of the country’s 12 191 
million people are said to have died in this conflict, and the preference for many children gained 192 
urgency as people mourned their losses (Pillsbury et al., 2011). While the SPLA originated among a 193 
group of Dinka rebels defecting from the Sudan national army, over time it loosely encompassed 194 
most rebel groups from other ethnic areas of the country, thereby exposing other tribal groups to its 195 
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military culture (Schomerus & Allen, 2010). Today, the SPLA serves as South Sudan’s regular army, 196 
and its ‘political wing’, the SPLM, is the country’s governing political party, though both have 197 
splintered into multiple factions (some ethnic) since 2013.  198 
From the late 1980s, the SPLA highlighted women’s reproductive capacities as a key contribution to 199 
the war effort (Jok, 1999a, b). Soldiers were encouraged to have as many children as possible in case 200 
they died in war. The military also promulgated the concept of “brotherhood in procreation” to 201 
encourage soldiers to support each other in their quest for progeny, even from other men’s wives 202 
and even through rape (Jok, 1999b, 440). Women were also urged to “hold up the reproductive 203 
front,” Jok explained in a radio interview (McNeish, 2013),  to contribute to future military power 204 
and to the continuity of village life and ethnic identities.  205 
By the mid-1990s, Dinka women commonly felt the military’s emphasis on reproduction as a 206 
national obligation exceeded traditional norms and lent men too much power over sexuality (Jok, 207 
1999b). Civilian populations protested when the sexual violence which accompanied military 208 
movements crossed ethnic lines, and the SPLA, regarding these protests as a threat to its popular 209 
support, responded by publicly executing rapists (Perner, 2001). When soldiers’ sexual violence 210 
occurred within ethnic communities, however, elites in both military and customary institutions 211 
were complacent because they feared allowing women to re-shape sexual norms themselves (Jok, 212 
1999b). In a context of young men conditioned to the use of force and precarious access to health 213 
and social care for women and their children, induced abortions appeared to become an increasingly 214 
common phenomenon: a small survey, contributing one of the only estimates from this time, 215 
suggested 35% of women terminated their pregnancies (Jok, 1999a).  216 
In the post-war period, militarised expectations of women’s fertility were repurposed for Southern 217 
nation-building and recovery as the SPLM sought to distinguish itself from the north both culturally 218 
and administratively, in preparation for Independence. Around the time of the Comprehensive 219 
Peace Agreement in 2005, for example, former rebel leaders in the highest political office set about 220 
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dismantling South Sudan’s only domestic family planning organisation, according to a 221 
parliamentarian interviewee. This was ostensibly done under a nationalist agenda because the 222 
organisation survived on international support through Khartoum, but it was clear to observers that 223 
it was actually opposition to foreign ideas about reproduction that underlay the move. According to 224 
this parliamentarian, SPLM officials entreated its staff “not to talk about family planning, [but to] 225 
allow people to produce as much as they can”. In the lead-up to the Independence referendum in 226 
2011, politicians again emphasised strengthening the nation through numbers. ‘Come back to be 227 
counted’ was the slogan of campaigns calling refugees back to re-build and re-populate South Sudan. 228 
Being counted was a political act to strengthen political negotiations with Khartoum because census 229 
estimates would ultimately determine the South’s share of oil wealth, and enabled refugees to 230 
demonstrate their citizenship in a nascent state (Hovil, 2010). In the buoyant pre-Independence 231 
atmosphere, the SPLM’s ideas about building a new nation were popular. Family planning, then, was 232 
not only unnecessary, but also unpatriotic. One health provider in Juba put it quite simply: “[i]n 233 
South Sudan, the history of this war, many people have died so it sounds as if you are anti-human, 234 
not promoting life.” Thus, reproduction after the war was most often spoken about as serving the 235 
new nation by replacing the high numbers of people who were lost. This was the key discourse that 236 
the Ministry of Health and its international partners sought to challenge. 237 
Family planning to build a healthy nation: ‘modern’ discourses on 238 
reproduction 239 
Given the extremely limited capacity of the new government’s Ministry of Health after the war, 240 
international institutions, notably the World Bank and the World Health Organization, and 241 
international donors working through international NGOs were central drivers of health policy 242 
formulation in South Sudan (Cometto et al., 2010). In assisting the Ministry of Health to design 243 
foundational health policies and financing mechanisms, their stated priorities were to implement 244 
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interventions with the highest evidence-based impact so as to demonstrate health as a ‘dividend’ of 245 
peace and prevent a return to war (ibid). Ministry of Health actors, many of whom had received 246 
university training or experience abroad, claimed the adoption of international best practices served 247 
to “fast forward” the development of health services (MoH-GoSS, 2007, 1). Early policy documents 248 
included a large number of sexual and reproductive health services including family planning and 249 
post-abortion care, though not safe abortion services (Roberts et al., 2008). Like in other African 250 
countries  (Storeng & Ouattara, 2014), offering post-abortion care was a politically palatable way for 251 
both domestic and international policy actors to promote the idea that they were providing  ‘life-252 
saving care’ without having to engage in the contentious issue of abortion rights.  253 
The international community was highly aware of the SPLA’s pro-natalist population replacement 254 
discourses. Consequently, many NGOs considered providing contraceptives a political and security 255 
risk. One NGO representative even feared that communities who rejected family planning might 256 
take-up arms against them and force programmes to close, compromising their wider maternal 257 
health and primary healthcare aims. As donors described in interviews, dispelling such fears was 258 
thus a key aim when USAID, UK Aid and the Ministry of Health commissioned a series of in-depth 259 
qualitative studies on South Sudanese attitudes and practices related to family planning which they 260 
hoped NGOs would read before designing interventions (Aveyard & Apune, 2013; Mason, 2012; 261 
Pillsbury et al., 2011).  262 
As in many parts of Africa, these studies characterised ‘family planning’ as a customary cultural ideal 263 
when practiced as birth spacing through post-partum abstinence, a healthy way of life that many 264 
Southern Sudanese communities aspired to return to. More controversially, however, the studies 265 
also highlighted the local realities that made these customary practices difficult and justified 266 
introducing modern methods of contraception, such as war-related displacement to urban or camp 267 
settings with restricted living space forcing husbands and wives to share bedrooms (Aveyard & 268 
Apune, 2013; Pillsbury et al., 2011). The studies documented suspicion and stigma associated with 269 
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modern contraceptive methods and popular discourse, lumping abortion with other examples of 270 
cultural ‘pollution’ imported by returnees and foreigners after the war, such as short skirts and hip-271 
hop culture (see also Grabksa, 2014). Like elsewhere, people commonly invoke such dichotomies 272 
between ‘modern’ and ‘customary’/‘traditional’ to make sense of competing gender ideologies 273 
(Plesset, 2006). Significantly, however, some policy actors claimed that the reports suggested 274 
communities’ sincere curiosity and openness to learning about modern health practices which could, 275 
potentially, extend to contraceptives. Other research supports this interpretation. For instance, 276 
Christian church-goers in South Sudan have sometimes been influenced by liberal Western ideas of 277 
modernity, including on reproductive health (Grabksa, 2014), and have come to see use of modern 278 
health care as an act of religiosity or patriotism: an acknowledgement of the sacrifices of war and 279 
part of the nation-building experience (Palmer et al., 2014).  280 
The new Ministry of Health’s first Family Planning Policy, which built on the commissioned studies, 281 
appealed to such patriotism, re-framing militarised pro-natalist discourses by counting loss of 282 
reproductive health services among the casualties of war: 283 
South Sudan has been devastated by decades of war in terms of loss of human 284 
life, massive displacement, destruction of both physical and social infrastructure, 285 
and loss of human resource development opportunities, including the loss of 286 
experienced health professionals. This, combined with a lack of awareness, has 287 
seriously limited both access to and use of quality reproductive health services 288 
including family planning (FP). As a result the country has some of the highest 289 
maternal and child mortality rates in Sub-Saharan Africa (MoH-GoSS, 2013a, p. 290 
1,). 291 
Like the commissioned studies, this policy document subtly sought to reposition attitudes on family 292 
planning, as a Ministry of Health representative explained: “We need to change this discourse to 293 
replace those lost with healthy people so that she [a woman] can look after her children and 294 
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contribute to the national economy. These are the twists and turns we need people to understand 295 
to link health and development.”  296 
Many health workers, discussing their experience of the country’s first family planning programmes, 297 
saw the association between family planning, abortion services and modernisation as an inevitable 298 
national trajectory. One obstetrician even predicted it would be only a matter of time before family 299 
planning and abortion services are as widely available as in neighbouring countries like Ethiopia, 300 
Sudan and Kenya: “Sometimes in Kenyatta [hospital in Nairobi] you have to clean 100, even 200 301 
pregnancies, so abortion was legalised to minimise these complications. For us, we will be heading 302 
to that, as urbanisation becomes a problem” Indeed, since 2013 especially, contraceptive coverage 303 
and method availability has expanded to include the internationally standard range of short- 304 
(condoms, pills, injections) and long-term (implants, intra-uterine devices) methods, as has access to 305 
safer medical abortion medicines (Hudgins et al., 2014).  306 
Among the public, however, such ideas around family planning and modernity did not yet resonate. 307 
Women’s group leaders spoke animatedly about several other reproductive health issues in local 308 
political terms: gender-based violence, fistula as a problem of early marriage, and HIV as a problem 309 
of widow inheritance, all of which were worse because of war. Discussions in the Maputo Protocol 310 
workshop revealed how groups had successfully argued for protection against fistula and for a 311 
women’s right to divorce by mobilising women’s and men’s desire to uphold reproductive norms 312 
which reward large families. Just as Jok’s ‘broken back’ euphemism simultaneously valorised many 313 
pregnancies and permitted a woman to terminate one, a lawyer described the best way to win a 314 
divorce was to prove that a woman wanted to contribute children to society but had been 315 
abandoned by her husband and therefore was denied her reproductive potential. Divorce would 316 
make her a better mother. No women’s groups, however, seemed to have developed arguments for 317 
or against family planning or abortion. As one representative said, “Women’s groups might take up 318 
family planning one day, but I don’t know...” 319 
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Contesting competing discourses in post-conflict Juba   320 
The tensions between customary, military and donor-influenced policy discourses have given rise to 321 
a range of societal responses, including tensions that erupt in legal battles, heated debate and even 322 
violence between women, men, and workers in health facilities. For example, while Ministry of 323 
Health discourses draw on ideas about liberalising women’s rights set out in aspirational 324 
constitutional documents, such legal ideas have not widely influenced decisions in customary courts, 325 
which remain important because the post-conflict state lacks capacity to extend government courts 326 
into rural areas (Deng, 2013). No court rejects contraceptives as inherently illegal. However, while 327 
South Sudan’s recently developed Bill of Rights states that women have the right to freedom of 328 
choice and thus do not need a man’s consent to use contraceptives, in customary courts, ultimate 329 
authority typically rests with men (Bior, 2013). As one constitutional lawyer explained: “[a]ll the 330 
customs in South Sudan for the 64 tribes favour men”. Since people in South Sudan “believe in 331 
lineage”, a man can theoretically argue for and be granted divorce if he reports that his wife has 332 
used contraceptives without his permission because this “perverts” the natural way of building 333 
families (ibid). Contraception “victimiz[es] him” by artificially limiting the future value of the dowry 334 
he has paid for a woman. According to Ministry of Health representatives, some men have 335 
successfully sued international organisations that provided contraception to their wives in 336 
customary courts.  337 
This legal context helps explain the ubiquitous stories family planning providers in Juba tell about 338 
their female clients being beaten by men who suspect they have been using contraception in secret. 339 
As one such provider described: “In our culture, if a woman does something secretly, he can beat 340 
her. […] If the husband refuses and then the lady goes [to get contraception]… It will bring big 341 
problems, even if she has 5 or 10 children, he will divorce”. Discussions around the choice of 342 
contraceptive method are therefore based not only on clinical considerations but also, as several 343 
antenatal care providers explained, on how well the method can be concealed, with injections, intra-344 
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uterine devices and implants preferred. Relatedly, health workers must also be prepared to risk 345 
anger from clients’ husbands: 346 
The other day, a man came carrying a gun, demanding the implant to be removed 347 
from his wife’s arm. We tried to talk to him, saying the woman came to us, she 348 
has a right. But he insisted and threatened us. So we said ‘Ok, no problem, we 349 
don’t want to spoil your relationship with your wife. We will remove, and she is 350 
welcome if she wants to come back another time.’ The woman consented, it was 351 
just not the man.  352 
Health providers also risk sanctions from some local government authorities who oppose family 353 
planning. One lawyer told of a health provider who was jailed for giving women contraception “in 354 
secret”. At her release two days later she was forced to choose between resigning and working 355 
under the surveillance of security guards. According to international organisations, medical 356 
personnel have chased away women seeking family planning counselling at antenatal clinics in 357 
Central Equatoria State, and, in Unity State, discouraged returnees from continuing contraception 358 
they had been using for years in Khartoum, claiming a different set of laws and norms existed in 359 
South Sudan.  360 
Such confrontations limit women’s options, but also, sometimes, transform men into unlikely 361 
advocates of family planning. Providers from several family planning organisations told stories about 362 
husbands who initially threatened them becoming “very good friends” of the organisation and 363 
promoting their services to others after having the chance to discuss contraceptives in detail at the 364 
clinic. Policy actors also identified politicians who have attended family planning workshops and 365 
come back “completely converted,” as one of them put it. But this is an unpredictable situation. 366 
Consequently, before providing contraception, many health workers seek to verify that a woman has 367 
her husband’s consent, even going so far as to request men’s phone numbers to confirm it. As one 368 
provider explained: “a midwife’s first question is always, ‘have you talked to your husband?’” 369 
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Abortion services engender even stronger tensions than contraception. As with secret contraceptive 370 
use, if a woman is discovered to have procured an abortion, she will often be punished; the “beating 371 
can go all the way to the health centre” to intimidate providers, claimed a representative of an 372 
international organisation. Police, routinely stationed at large hospitals to resolve disputes, may 373 
intervene in such instances but also contribute to an atmosphere in which providers admit they 374 
sometimes feel compelled to report induced abortion during the course of treatment.  375 
This may help explain why women in cities like Juba often seek abortions and post-abortion care 376 
from private sector providers, particularly those operated by foreigners, where both government 377 
and social surveillance is less intrusive. However, people who oppose abortion occasionally force 378 
activities in the private sector into the political space of public hospitals. In 2012, an article in a 379 
prominent daily newspaper reported that a local politician abducted and unlawfully detained health 380 
workers from a private clinic he suspected of performing a “secret abortion” on his female relative, 381 
bringing them and the patient to Juba Teaching Hospital. Part of the moral authority he appealed to 382 
related to the type of place his relative had sought the abortion, rather than the abortion itself, 383 
reportedly saying: “I demanded to know why she was in a private clinic instead of a civil hospital” 384 
(Sudan Tribune, 2012). Appealing to readers’ patriotism, the implication here is that outside public 385 
hospitals, the capacity of the new state to control or safeguard women’s reproduction is critically at 386 
stake. 387 
Tensions also abound around international NGOs’ work on reproductive health. During fieldwork, 388 
rumours circulated that the government passively aggressively refused to renew a Memorandum of 389 
Understanding required for one international family planning NGO to operate legally in the country 390 
because it suspected the organisation to provide abortions illegally. Meanwhile, it allowed a 391 
domestic family planning organisation closed by rebel leaders several years earlier to re-open. The 392 
small number of international organisations supporting post-abortion care programmes have also 393 
faced protest online (Baklinski, 2014; Dennis, 2012). Civil society bloggers have called for their 394 
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greater regulation, pointing to a profound discomfort with the uncertainty created by the presence 395 
of multiple strong, state-sanctioned discourses on reproduction. For example, in a post to a  396 
diaspora-run blog site (Dennis, 2012), the author, a concerned citizen in the capital, appears morally 397 
opposed to abortion, but ends by asking the government to resolve the ambiguities that cause 398 
people to operate in secret:  399 
After 21 years of civil war in Sudan where millions of lives were lost, we would 400 
imagine that the most logical programme for the world’s youngest nation—South 401 
Sudan, would be one that promotes population growth to replace the lost lives. … 402 
Abortion is illegal in South Sudan and any organization or individual promoting 403 
abortion is promoting an illegality … it is a bloody and murderous affair … The big 404 
and urgent question is: for how long will this carnage continue? Or if it’s the best 405 
thing to have ever happened for our girls and women, then let the government 406 
openly announce that they want to, or have already, legalize abortion … South 407 
Sudanese must know because their love ones are dying under mysterious 408 
circumstances, all under the nose of a seemingly dysfunctional government in 409 
Juba and beyond the reach of the law! [sic] 410 
The author implies that the ruling SPLM has lost much of its legitimacy as parts of South Sudan have 411 
slid back into internal ethnic conflict in the last two years. Within this context, nationalist rhetoric 412 
seems less enchanting. A domestic policy analyst claimed that, increasingly, people are dismissing 413 
the population replacement discourse as SPLA propaganda, particularly ethnic groups from the 414 
southern Equatorian states not directly involved in the current crisis. The crisis has also provided 415 
political space for some politicians to justify the Ministry of Health/donor discourse, as illustrated by 416 
the question one parliamentarian poses in his efforts to lobby support for family planning 417 
organisations privately with other politicians and local authorities: “if leaders are not taking 418 
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responsibility for the bad behaviours of their constituents who are keeping the country at war, how 419 
can they be expected to promote healthy behaviours like family planning?” 420 
Sanctuary & surveillance in Protection of Civilians camps 421 
The ethnic character of today’s conflict has amplified reproductive surveillance of displaced women 422 
and the importance of population replacement to some ethnic rebel movements. Simultaneously, 423 
crisis-response NGOs have accelerated family planning interventions in UN Protection of Civilians 424 
camps, a type of uniquely protected humanitarian space requiring little negotiation with domestic 425 
governments. Here, tensions between competing discourses and practices have come to a head.  426 
Relatively early on in the current crisis, international NGOs began offering short-term methods of 427 
contraception to populations living in UN camps, giving women who previously had to visit tertiary 428 
health facilities or private pharmacies to access such commodities easy and free access. Accordingly, 429 
women elders in one camp said they were counselling younger women to treat this situation of 430 
extraordinary access as a learning opportunity, saying “before going back to the village, we want to 431 
know how to use this medicine safely”. Camp statistics so far, however, indicate relatively low 432 
uptake. For example, clinic staff at one camp visited in Juba in 2014 reported between 0 and 11 433 
family planning service users per month for a population of around 13,000 people.  434 
Stories from the camp suggest a number of possible explanations for such low uptake. Nuer women 435 
who have sought refuge in UN camps in Juba fled ethnically-motivated violence, including sexual 436 
violence (CARE, 2014). A year on, Nuer people still feared leaving camps and felt widely persecuted 437 
and suspicious of activities that could be associated with the Dinka-dominated state, including 438 
international organisations who must cooperate with the state to operate. For example, encamped 439 
communities turned away food aid suspected to be poisoned (Migiro, 2015) and some people 440 
refused vaccines during a WHO-led cholera campaign, citing distrust of the agencies involved 441 
(Peprah et al., 2016). In this context of conspiracy and fear, international organisation 442 
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representatives recalled that the introduction of family planning commodities into camp health 443 
services were protested as another attack on the well-being of the Nuer community; residents even 444 
successfully lobbied to have one organisation pushed out of the camp for this reason.  445 
Health workers reported that population replacement rhetoric had also re-emerged in camp 446 
discourses, with comments such as “we need to make more Nuer fighters” shared by some men at 447 
meetings and on social media. On the other hand, an older women’s group leader explained that 448 
women feared pregnancy in the poor camp conditions and considered pregnancy as “something for 449 
the future”. This, however, did not translate into popular recognition of a need for modern family 450 
planning or abortion. Both remained greatly stigmatised, conceptualised as services required only by 451 
women who were having extra-marital affairs. Young women whose husbands were away fighting 452 
were the target of roving information campaigns, but could not legitimately use them, she claimed, 453 
or people would say, “why do you need it, you are taking it [contraception] for whom?”. 454 
Inter-clan conflicts also erupted in camps when pregnancy evoked suspicions of adultery or when 455 
women were discovered to have induced abortions. Referring to one widely known incident, 456 
another women’s leader showed photos she had taken of a foetus retrieved from a communal 457 
latrine. She claimed that the woman procured an abortifacient outside the camp, induced the 458 
abortion in her tent and then was obliged to dispose of the foetus in the latrine. The woman’s 459 
husband was absent and neighbours had severely beaten her upon discovery for both the abortion 460 
and the assumed adultery. International organisations have reported similar events in other UN 461 
camps populated by Nuer and other ethnic groups (Radio Tamazuj, 2014). Thus, as one NGO 462 
representative explained, in the tense confines of camps, there was a need for post-abortion care - 463 
“a lot, by international standards”- both to deal with unsafe abortions and the collateral social 464 
effects. In the close confines of camp life, women’s use of state- and NGO-sanctioned contraception 465 
and abortion services is met by neighbours’ surveillance and sanctioning on behalf of the ethnic 466 
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group when husbands are away fighting. Where ideologies are being violently negotiated, such 467 
services are thus unintentionally inviting violence onto users. 468 
Conclusion 469 
South Sudan is in dramatic flux as new national, ethnic, gender and personal identities are being 470 
forged. Recovery from war necessitates reconciling cultural differences accrued through processes 471 
of militarisation, displacement into neighbouring cultures and exposure to globalism and 472 
humanitarianism (Grabksa, 2014; Hammond, 2004). The post-conflict context thus provides a 473 
valuable window into many contested cultural and political domains, including reproductive health, 474 
and the way in which the expansion of social policy and services becomes an integral part of peace- 475 
and nation-building efforts.   476 
Our analysis shows that reproductive health discourses have been actively shaped by rapidly 477 
evolving institutions in ways that appeal to South Sudanese peoples’ aspirations to live in a country 478 
of their own making. The competing nature of these discourses demonstrate the incoherence of 479 
South Sudan’s current nation-building project: the State in effect has incomplete control of the 480 
nation(s) within its borders and this larger cultural battle between customary, militarised and 481 
modernised ideologies is expressed as contestation and even violence.  482 
Humanitarian organisations have recently been criticised for neglecting to integrate family planning 483 
and abortion services in crisis responses due to political and donor sensitivities; insufficient 484 
understanding of abortion legality; a tendency to see the services as a ‘development’ rather than 485 
‘emergency’ need;  and a perception that the services are complicated to provide or that they are 486 
not needed (Casey & McGinn, 2016; Tanabe et al., 2015). Here, we have shown that an additional 487 
reason is NGO workers’ perception that family planning and abortion services are not wanted by the 488 
population and even constitute a security and political risk to organisations and their ability to 489 
provide other priority interventions.  490 
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Sexual violence can provide a ‘comfortable’ justification with which humanitarian organisations can 491 
provide abortion services in crises (Casey & McGinn, 2016). Our observations in UN camps support 492 
this idea: international organisations have begun justifying the need for abortion in relation to rape 493 
(Radio Tamazuj, 2014), but they have been publicly silent on the potential that pregnancy 494 
prevention or abortion may be associated with consensual sex. Reproductive surveillance in 495 
displaced person camps, which we understand as a form of reproductive control, has also been 496 
under-appreciated here and, potentially, globally (see, for example, omissions in Hudson (2016)).  497 
Given that health workers deal directly with patients in distress, health facilities may be particularly 498 
‘permeable’ spaces where the effects of violence experienced in wider society are easily felt (di 499 
Martino, 2002). Our analysis is one of few to show that gender-based violence and violence towards 500 
health workers can be a potential outcome of family planning and abortion services, especially when 501 
used clandestinely (see also Bawah et al. (1999)). Additionally, we have shown how intra-communal 502 
violence can be an unintended outcome of these services in contexts of post-conflict nation-building. 503 
The conceptualisation of reproductive health services as a risk to cultural systems is not unique to 504 
post-conflict settings, but is especially clear in South Sudan where there has been so little exposure 505 
to modern health services. Men’s sometimes violent resistance to modern contraceptives reflects 506 
not only patriarchal attitudes, but also their view of such technologies as foreign and therefore 507 
threatening to South Sudanese identity. Kurds, as minorities in Turkey, are similarly resistant to 508 
government-advocated family planning and caesarean-section deliveries because they are seen as 509 
technologies of cultural assimilation (Erten, 2015). In clinical settings, supporting women to use 510 
contraception or undergo abortion in secret may be an appropriate individual-level harm-reduction 511 
approach to violence from male partners (Miller & Silverman, 2010; Moore et al., 2010). Such 512 
clandestine behaviour may appear as capitulation to the dominant ideology behind customary and 513 
military discourses. Alternatively, it can also be seen as an act of resistance or resilience pursued by 514 
relatively powerless individuals; an unavoidable necessity when resolution of competing discourses 515 
in the near term is unlikely (Grabksa, 2014; Wirtz et al., 2014).  516 
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In complex post-conflict settings like South Sudan, policy and interventions related to family 517 
planning and abortion thus invite contestation, resistance and even violence. Understanding the 518 
political, social and historical discrepancies and tensions between competing discourses is essential 519 
to understanding behaviour and the uptake (or lack thereof) of new policies and programmes. 520 
Further research should examine women’s reactions to policy change, the cultural, structural and 521 
other reasons why women use services (or not), as well as the sustainability of donor-funded 522 
initiatives to increase family planning in light of their current tensions with cultural ideals. Women’s 523 
groups, in particular, should be involved in making sense of nation-building discourses, to shape 524 
both the construction of problems related to women’s reproduction and their solutions. State and 525 
NGO actors should work with women to meet safety, accessibility and dignity standards in delivering 526 
abortion and family planning programmes. They should also collaborate with social protection 527 
initiatives to mitigate and respond to interpersonal and communal violence against women in real 528 
time (Global Protection Cluster, 2014). While reproductive surveillance, control and violence may be 529 
expected during war, its roots transcend war and peace (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004) and so 530 
should be anticipated during peace-building processes, too. 531 
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Research highlights 
• In post-conflict South Sudan, institutions are reorganising, identities shifting 
• Humanitarian family planning discourses clash with customary and military ideals 
• Peace-building, which includes family planning, leads to unexpected gender violence 
• Social groups are policing reproductive decision-making in displaced person camps 
